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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

DANNY WETTSTEIN,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case No.
12827

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant was convicted of the crime of robbery
at a bench trial held before the Honorable VeNoy Christofferson, Judge, First Judicial Court, Cache County,
State of Utah, on December 9, 1971.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
After conviction for robbery, the defendant was sen·
tenced to the Utah State Prison for the indeterminate
term as provided by law. During the course of the proceedings, the lower court denied the defendant's motion
to suppress evidence and to suppress line-up identification.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The trial court's denial of the appellant's motion to
suppress evidence and the in-court identification, as well
as the verdict of guilty, should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
For the convenience of the court the respondent has
used the same designations of the transcript as employed
in the appellant's brief.
The respondent agrees generally with the facts as
expressed by the appellant in his brief, with the following
additions and clarifications.
It is not clear from the transcript what type of vehicle was used to extricate the get-a-way car. After leaving the station with the money, the robber returned and
asked the station operator about using either the truck
or car located in the bay area of the station to free the
stuck automobile (TR-9). After freeing himself, the op·
erator went outside to look at the area where the geta-way car had become stuck and saw a Ford car parked
on the road - the same Ford which had been parked in
the bays. No mention is made of a truck (TR-10).
More important, however, is the Trial Court's dispo·
sition of the appellant's motion to suppress. The appel·
lant in his brief states that the motion to suppress all
items obtained by use of the search warrant was granted.
A close examination of the transcript fails to reveal that
such a motion vms granted. In the District Court Minute
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Book 34 Page 242 (P-62), the motion to suppress evidence
was commenced on October 20, 1971, at which time the
Trial Court denied that motion as to certain photographs
and reserved a ruling on the other parts of the motion.
On October 22, 1971, the District Court Minute Book 34
Page 244 (P-62), indicates that a further hearing was
held on the motion to suppress, and the motion was denied.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE PHOTOGRAPHS TAKEN OF APPELLANT'S AUTOMOBILE DID NOT CONSTITUTE A SEARCH AND SEIZURE WITHIN
THE MEANING OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THEREFORE NO SEARCH
WARRANT WAS REQUIRED.

The facts of the case at bar fall within the general
"clear view doctrine" which the Supreme Court adopted
in Hester v. United States, 265 U. S. 57 (1924). In Hester,
revenue officers approached a house and concealed themselves to observe unlawful activities involving "moonshine" whiskey. The defendant was seen handing over
a bottle of the illegal substance and was convicted on the
testimony of the officers. The defendant appealed, alleging that the testimony should have been excluded as violative of the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court
upheld the conviction, stating that although the witnesses
held no warrants and were trespassers on the land, the
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protection of the Fourth Amendment extends to people
in their "persons, houses, papers and effects" and not t.o
open fields where the defendant's own acts disclosed the
evidence.
The court in Hester provides guidelines for the disposition of the case at bar. Officer Crockett was able t.o
observe the suspected robbery vehicle from a driveway
which runs along the side of the Fonnesbeck residence
(MS-19). The appellant had not attempted to hide the
vehicle and even though the police officer walked up the
Fonnesbeck driveway to take the pictures (MS-37), the
fact that the vehicle was in plain view would bring this
case within the Hester doctrine and therefore not within
the prohibition of the Fourth Amendment.
Recent cases have followed the Hester rationale in
determining whether evidence was obtained in violation
of the Fourth Amendment, even where the officers have
trespassed to obtain the information. In Atwell v. United
States, 414 F. 2d 136 (1969), the officers trespassed on
private property to observe an unregistered distilling
apparatus. The court allowed the testimony and ex·
plained:
"Appellant argues that the government should
have proved that there was not an unlawful search
or seizure before being allowed to introduce any
testimony regarding what the officers saw at the
still site. But inasmuch as the protection of the
Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches
and seizures does not extend to 'open fields', there
was no unreasonable search . . . Moreover, even
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if the officers were trespassing on private property, a trespass does not of itself constitute an
illegal search." Id. at 138.

The Atwell reasoning adds credence to the respondent's argument that the photographs were not prohibited
by the Fourth Amendment. A more vivid illustration of
the limits of the Fourth Amendment is found in Ponce
v. Craven, 409 F. 2d 621 (1969). In Ponce, police officers
standing outside the partly opened bathroom window of a
motel room were able to overhear a conversation and observe the defendant washing narcotic paraphernalia. After
his conviction the defendant filed a petition of habeas
corpus, alleging that the officers had violated the Fourth
Amendment by their observations, but the court upheld
the conviction, saying:

"If a person knowingly exposes his activities

to public view and hearing, he is not entitled to

have these activities protected against searches
and seizures ... Further, if a person relies upon
privacy in a given situation, that reliance must
be reasonable and justified under the particular
circumstances . . . Ponce's reliance on privacy in
his motel room was not reasonable under the circumstances. If he did not wish to be observed, he
could have drawn his blinds. The officers did not
infringe upon any reasonable expectation of privacy in this case by observing with their eyes the
activities visible through the window ... Nor was
there any unreasonable intrusion upon privacy
when the officers overheard conversation from outside the motel window." Id. at 625.
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Applying Ponce to the facts of the instant case, the ap.
pellant did not conceal his automobile, and therefore,
could not reasonably have expected its location to remain
a secret. The vehicle was in plain view, and although
the pictures were taken while trespassing on private property, the circumstances would not require this Court to
suppress the photographs as a violation of the Fourth
Amendment.
The Fourth Amendment cannot be used as a defense
to every evidence-gathering activity that the government
may initiate. This constitutional guarantee is dependent
upon the specific acts of each case, as was apparent in
Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967). In that case
the defendant was convicted upon evidence obtained
through an electronic listening device that was placed on
a telephone booth the defendant was using. The Supreme
Court reversed the conviction but explained that: "The
Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even at his own
home or office, is not a subject of the Fourth Amend·
ment." Id. at 351. The court rejected the notion that any
particular area can be labelled as constitutionally pro·
tected, holding that the crucial factor is the reasonable
expectation of the individual. A vehicle parked in a driveway and which is visible from an open alleyway cannot
be considered to be in a "constitutionally protected area."
The appellant did not locate his automobile in the drive·
way in an attempt to conceal it. Had this been his inten·
tion he surely would have found a garage or secluded area

7

· away from the plain view of the public gaze. There was
no reasonable expectation of privacy, and given the
Hester doctrine, the photographs did not constitute a
search and seizure.

POINT II.
THE LANGUAGE OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT PROHIBITING UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES DOES
NOT INCLUDE THE TAKING OF A PHOTOGRAPH.
The general usage of the words "search" and "seizure" does not contemplate the taking of a photograph.
In 79 C. J. S. Searches and Seizures, Sec. 1, search is defined as:

"An examination of a man's house, buildings,
or premises, or of his person, with a view to the
discovery of contraband or elicit or stolen property
or some evidence of guilt to be used in the prosecution of a criminal action for some crime or
offense with which he is charged."
Seizure, on the other hand, "contemplates a forcible dispossession of the owner, and it is not a voluntary surrender."
Not only have the legal encyclopedias narrowly defined the terms of the Fourth Amendment, but numerous
cases have also done so. In People v. West, 300 P. 2d 729
(1956), the court held:
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"A search implies a prying into hidden places
for that which is concealed and that the object
searched for has been hidden or intentionally put
out of the way. While it has been said that ordi.
narily searching is a function of sight, it is generally held that the mere looking at that which is
open to view is not a 'search.' A seizure contemplates a forcible dispossession of the owner and
it is not a voluntary surrender." Id. at 733.
From the accepted interpretations of the Fourth
Amendment, it is apparent that the taking of a photograph is not constitutionally prohibited. In the instant
case there was no examination or prying into that which
was concealed, neither was there an attempt to dispossess
the appellant of his car. And even if this Court found
that there were a constructive seizure, it should not be
classified as unreasonable. The Fourth Amendment was
not intended to fit the circumstances proposed by the
appellant and should not be so extended.
POINT III.
EVEN IF THE PHOTOGRAPHING OF THE
APPELLANT'S VEHICLE CONSTITUTED A
SEIZURE, IT WAS JUSTIFIED UNDER
THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION.
The trial
lant's motion
in which one
was the case
with exigent

court in delivering its decision on the appel·
to suppress pointed out the different ways
can make a legal search. Included in these
where probable cause was shown, coupled
circumstances (MS-107). In the instant
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case probable cause was apparent, and in light of recent
cases the exigent circumstance requirement was satisfied.
Probable cause has been defined in Carroll v. United
States, 267 U. S. 132 (1924), as when:
" . . . a peace off'icer . . . suspects one on his
own knowledge of facts, or on facts communicated
to him by others, and thereupon he has reasonable
ground to believe that the accused has been guilty
of felony ... " Id. at 161.
Under this definition, the following facts of this case
show probable cause to have existed.
On March 26, 1971, the Yeates Mobil Service Station
in Nibley, Utah, was robbed by an armed gunman (TR2). The victim notified the police and reported the details
of the crime (TR-10). Shortly after the time of the robbery, two witnesses passed by the Yeates station and saw
two cars stuck in a ditch. The witnesses were approached
by an individual who asked for their assistance in freeing
the cars (MS-68). The witnesses offered to go home and
return with their truck, but on returning found that the
car had already left (MS-70). Becoming suspicious, the
witnesses called the police, and later that same night
identified the appellant's picture at the police station
from among several mug shots (MS-71, 73). Again on
March 28, 1971, the witnesses were shown several photographs and identified the appellant's picture as the man
they had seen at the service station (MS-74). The witnesses also identified the vehicle at the service station as
a light blue Studebaker Lark (MS-69). The suspect iden-
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tified by the witnesses had been observed driving such a
light blue Studebaker Lark by Officer Crockett (MS-31).
Officer Crockett was informed that the appellant's vehicle,
a light blue Studebaker Lark, was located in the rear of
the Fonnesbeck residence (MS-14, 15). After finding out
where the vehicle was located, Officer Crockett drove up
an alleyway near the Fonnesbeck property and observed
the car (MS-17). At this point the officer had sufficient
knowledge to satisfy the requirement of probable cause.
From his own knowledge of the facts, coupled with the
information provided by the witnesses, he had reasonable
grounds to believe that the car he observed had been involved in the armed robbery.
The "exigent circumstance" requirement has been
modified by the Supreme Court in Chambers v. Marony,
399 U. S. 42 (1970). In that case a vehicle seen leaving
the scene of a robbery was stopped, the occupants
arrested, and the vehicle removed to the police station.
While the automobile was there, the police searched it
without a warrant. The defendant objected to the search,
but the Supreme Court upheld its validity explaining that
although the search could not be justified as incident to
an arrest,
" ... if an effective search is to be made at
any time either the search must be made immed·
iately without a warrant, or the car itself must be
seized and held without a warrant for
period is necessary to obtain a warrant for search.
Id. at 51.
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Under the unique circumstmices of this case, the second above mentioned alternative was used. The car was
technically "seized" by a photograph which was necessary
in obtaining the search warrant. No search was made
prior to the issuance of the warrant, but rather a photo
was taken to facilitate that issuance.
In Chambers, supra, there were no exigent circumstances at the time the search was accomplished. The
vehicle was at the police station and the occupants under
arrest. But still the Supreme Court held:

"For constitutional purposes, we see no difference between on the one hand seizing and holding
a car before presenting the probable cause issue
to a magistrate and on the other hand carrying
out an immediate search without a warrant." Id.
at 52.
Officer Crockett chose the first alternative, "seizing"
the car through a photograph and then presenting the
probable cause issue to a magistrate. Probable cause was
evident, and what may have been a technical seizure was,
therefore, justified.
The appellant proposes that State v. Richards, 26
Ut. 2d 318, 489 P. 2d 422 (1971), is applicable to the instant case. In that case a police officer made a warrantless seizure of the defendant's truck under the belief that
the truck was involved in another crime different from
the one for which the defendant was arrested. An examination of the court's holding reveals, however, that the
case was decided on the issue of probable cause. The
court stated:
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"In the instant action, the sole justification
for the seizure was the expressed belief of Officer
Fife, that the truck was involved in another crime.
The record is void of any facts or circumst.ances
t.o support this belief and therefore will not presently support a finding of probable cause t.o seize
the truck." Id. at 424.
In the case at bar probable cause was established by
the identification of the witnesses and the officer's own
knowledge. Chambers, supra, upheld a warrantless search
that was made without exigent circumstances. If the
court finds that phot.ographing the appellant's vehicle
constituted a seizure, such a seizure can be justified un·
der the Chambers' ruling since probable cause was evi·
dent.
POINT IV.
IDENTIFICATION OF THE APPELLANT
WAS NOT VIOLATIVE OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND WAS PROPERLY
ADMITTED.
A. THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE APPELLANT RESULTING FROM THE
SHOW-UP IS AN EXCEPTION TO THE
GILBERT-WADE RULES AND SHOULD
NOT HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED.
The Supreme Court in United States v. Wade, 388
U. S. 218 (1967), expressed the following rationale for
its ruling:
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". . . we scrutinize any pretrial confrontation
of the accused to determine whether the presence
of his counsel is necessary to preserve the defenright to a fair trial as affected by his
nght meaningfully to cross-examine the witnesses
against him and to have effective assistance of
counsel at the trial itself. It calls upon us to analyze whether potential substantial prejudice to
defendant's rights inheres in the particular confrontation and the ability of counsel to help avoid
that prejudice." Id. at 227.
Based on the aforementioned language, courts have
not applied the Gilbert-Wade rules where the circumstances mitigated against application. This Court recognized this exception in State v. McGee, 24 Ut. 2d 396, 473
P. 2d 388 (1970), where the identification came within
minutes after the commission of the crime.
The basis for the exception is that the courts must
balance the need for prompt identification against the
ability of counsel to avoid erroneous identification. In
the instant case the presence of counsel at the show-up
was unnecessary. The Ames had already identified the
appellant on two separate occasions. The appellant was
neither requested to wear any particular article of clothing nor asked to say anything. The confrontation did not
prejudice the appellant's rights, the presence of counsel
would have added nothing in helping to preserve the
appellant's right to a fair trial, and therefore, the GilbertWade rules do not apply.
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B.

THE IN-COURT IDENTIFICATION
WAS BASED ON AN INDEPENDENT
SOURCE.

If, in the alternative, it should be determined that
the show-up were improper, the in-court identification
had an independent source and was not tainted by sug.
gestion from the show-up.

The Supreme Court in Wade, supra, reasoned that
the in-court identification of Wade would be admitted if
" . . . the in-court identifications were based on observations of the suspect other than the line-up identification."
Id. at 240.
In Wade, the court relied on the test applied in Wong
Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471 (1963), ns the proper
one to be applied in these situations:
"Whether, granting establishment of the pri·
mary illegality, the evidence to which instant ob·
jection is made has been come at by exploitation
of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.
McGuire, Evidence of Guilt, 221 (1969) ." Id. at
241. (Emphasis added.)
This court has also accepted an in-court identifica·
tion when based on an independent source. In State v.
Vasquez, 22 Ut. 2d 277, 451 P. 2d 786 (1969), a man that
was beaten and robbed, later identified the defendant
at a line-up conducted in the absence of counsel. The
defendant filed a motion to suppress, but this court found:
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"It is conceded that Vasquez was not advised
that he could
counsel present at the line-up,
nor that he knew m advance that a line-up was to
take place. . . . The record before this court does
permit an independent judgment and discloses
that Coxey's in-court identification had an independent source, namely, Coxey's description of the
automobile and its occupants and his identification
of Vasquez and the other four defendants shortly
after the occurrence and during the course of their
apprehension." Id. at 279.
The record before the court in this case establishes
that the in-court identification was based on the Ames'
personal observations at the scene of the crime rather
than the shmv-up, thus meeting the test of being "sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of any primary taint."
At the time the Ames stopped to offer their assistance
the scene was well lighted. There was a mercury vapor
light on top of a pole that cast a fairly strong light (MS92, 93) . Also there were lights from the service station
and the dash lights on the car (MS-84). The Ames were
driving a small compact, a Volkswagen, and were therefore very close to the appellant when he put his head
down into the open window (MS-68). Mrs. Ames leaned
over to the driver's window to hear what the appellant
was saying, and was close enough to have been able to
touch the appellant's nose (MS-89). Her identification
of the appellant's photo on two separate occasions was
based on what she had observed at the scene of the crime
(MS-90). Mr. Ames was within a foot of the appellant
when he approached the Ames' car and asked for assist-
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ance (MS-92). In attempting to free the car, Mr. Ames
took hold of the left door handle right next to the appeJ.
lant who was driving the car (MS-92). Mr. Ames was
given another look when he talked to the appellant before
leaving the scene (MS-92). During this course of events
both Mr. and Mrs. Ames were able to observe the appeJ.
lant for several minutes as the group of men worked to
extricate the vehicle from the ditch. Another important
corroborating fact was that the light blue Studebaker
Lark that Mrs. Ames identified (MS-69) as the vehicle
stuck in the ditch was owned by the appellant (MS-5, 75).
Regardless of the court's determination of the legality
of the show-up, there is ample evidence to support a finding that the in-court identification was based on independent sources. Both Mr. and Mrs. Ames observed the
appellant at close range for several minutes. The vehicle
that was described by Mrs. Ames was owned by the appellant. Given the extent of the Ames' observations, the
taint of the show-up has been sufficiently dissipated t.o
allow the in-court identification.
C. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY INTERPRETED THE STANDARD OF
PROOF NECESSARY TO REMOVE THE
TAINT OF AN ILLEGAL LINE-UP.
The appellant in charging the trial court with error
confuses the clear and convincing standard of proof proposed in Wade, supra. Wade did not require the state ro
show by clear and convincing evidence that the line-up
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did not influence the identification. What Wade did require was explained in McGee, supra, wherein this court
said:
"The court [in Wade] held that a courtroom
identification, in fact, the fruit of a suspect pretrial identification, was inadmissible, unless the
prosecution can establish by clear and convincing
evidence that the in-court identification was based
on observations of the suspect other than the lineup identification." Id. at 391.
The trial court stated that in Wade the conviction
was vacated to allow the prosecution to show that the incourt identification was based on an independent source
(MS-110). The requirement is not to show that the lineup did not influence the identification, for as the trial
court said, "To hold that you would throw out any incourt identification where there is a line-up and no counsel present" (MS-110). The prosecution must show by
clear and convincing evidence that the identification has
an independent source and since the facts of the instant
case provide such evidence, the in-court identification
must be allowed.
POINT V.
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE APPELLANT'S ALLEGATIONS HAVE MERIT,
THE CONVICTION MUST NEVERTHELESS STAND UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF
HARMLESS ERROR.
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Rules 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, states:
"No error in either the admission or the exof
and no error or defect in any
ruling or order or m anything done or omitted by
the court or by any of the parties, is ground for
granting a new trial or otherwise disturbing the
judgment or order, unless refusal to take such
action appears to the court inconsistent with sub.
stantial justice. The court at every stage of the
proceeding must disregard any error or defect in
the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties."
As Rule 61 explains, a judgment should not be dis·
turbed unless refusal to do so would result in substantial
injustice. This Court has gone further in interpreting
Rule 61, and in Startin v. Madsen, 120 Ut. 631, 237 P. 2d
834 (1951), held that:
"Before the appellant is entitled tc prevail,
he must show both error and prejudice; that is,
that his substantial rights are affected and that
there is at least a fair likelihood that the result.s
would have been different." Id. at 836.
Along these same lines this court held in In Re
Baxter's Estate, 16 Ut. 2d 284, 399 P. 2d 442 (1965), that:
"When the trial is to the court, his rulings on
evidence need not be subjected to quite such
cal scrutiny, as when it is to the jury, 1?ecause m
arriving at his conclusions upon the ISsues,
will include in his considerations of them bis
knowledge and his judgment as to the competency,
materiality and effect of evidence." Id. at 445.
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In the case at bar, which was heard without a jury,
none of the appellant's allegations would justify a remand
for a new trial. Even if the Ames' testimony and identification were suppressed, the record is replete with ample
grounds for conviction. The appellant stipulated that the
testimony would be as outlined by Mr. Sorensen, the
District Attorney (TR-6). The testimony of Gene
Turner was introduced. Turner was with the appellant
when the robbery occurred, and would have testified that
the appellant, Robert Sheen, and himself, were the men
who robbed the Yeates Service Station (TR-17, 18). Testimony of Ann Fonnesbeck was also introduced. She
would have testified that the appellant came to her home
the night of the robbery, March 26, 1971, in the company
of Turner and Sheen. She would have further stated that
the three participants talked about the robbery and in her
presence admitted that they had robbed the service station (TR-14, 15). Given these two witnesses and their
testimony, the results of the trial would not have been
changed even if the trial court had granted the appellant's
motion to suppress, and should therefore not be remanded
on appeal.
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CONCLUSION
The appellant has not been denied any constitutional
guarantee under the Fourth Amendment, neither was the
in-court identification so tainted, as to necessitate suppression, and therefore the lower court's ruling and judg.
ment should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
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